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The aim of this paper is to evaluate four competing theoretical perspectives that explain cross-national 
variations in the level of informal sector entrepreneurship. Scholarship has until now argued that the 
informal entrepreneurship is a result of either: economic under-development and a lack of 
modernization of governance (modernization theory); high taxes and state over-interference (neo-
liberal theory); inadequate state intervention to protect workers from poverty (political economy 
theory) or the asymmetry between the laws and regulations of formal institutions and the unwritten 
socially shared rules of informal institutions (institutional theory). Reporting the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey (WBES) on the varying prevalence of informal entrepreneurship across 142 
countries, the finding is that neo-liberal theory is refuted but the tenets of the modernization, political 
economy and institutional theories are confirmed. Informal entrepreneurship is found to be 
significantly higher when there is economic under-development, a lack of modernization of 
governance, inadequate state intervention to protect workers from poverty and greater asymmetry 
between the formal and informal institutions. The paper concludes by discussing the theoretical and 
policy implications of these findings.  
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; informal economy; shadow economy; economic development; 
development economics; developing economies. 
1.   Introduction 
Why are enterprises more likely to operate unregistered and in the informal sector in some 
countries than others? Given that two-thirds of all enterprises are unregistered at start-up 
(Autio and Fu, 2015), that at least half of all enterprises globally are unregistered (Acs et 
al., 2013), and that an even higher proportion are engaged in entrepreneurship in the 
informal sector if the uncalculated number of formal enterprises under-reporting sales is 
included (Williams, 2018), this is an important question to answer.  
Until now, four competing theoretical perspectives have been used to explain the cross-
national variations in the prevalence of the informal sector in general and informal 
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entrepreneurship more particularly. First, modernization theory asserts that the level of 
competition from unregistered or informal enterprises will be greater where there is 
economic under-development and a lack of modernization of governance (La Porta and 
Schleifer, 2014), Second, neo-liberal theory argues that the level of competition from 
unregistered or informal enterprises will be greater when there are high taxes and state 
over-interference (De Soto, 2001). Third, and conversely, political economy theory views 
informality to be higher when there is inadequate state intervention to protect workers from 
poverty (Castells and Portes, 1989), and finally, institutional theory asserts that the greater 
is the asymmetry between the laws and regulations of formal institutions and the unwritten 
socially shared rules of informal institutions, the higher is the level of informality 
(Windebank and Horodnic, 2017; Webb et al., 2009, 2013, 2014). Therefore, the aim of 
this paper is to evaluate these contrasting explanations for the cross-national variations in 
the prevalence of unregistered or informal enterprises (i.e., informal entrepreneurship), by 
which is here meant those starting-up and/or owning and managing an enterprise which 
does not register with and/or declare some or all its production and/or sales to the 
authorities for tax, benefit and/or labor law purposes when it should do so (Ketchen et al., 
2014; Siqueira et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2017a).   
To commence, section 2 provides a theoretical framing by reviewing the competing 
theoretical perspectives that can be used to explain cross-national variations in the 
prevalence of informal entrepreneurship. This will result in a set of propositions that can 
be tested to evaluate the competing explanations for the cross-national variations in the 
extent of informal entrepreneurship. Section 3 then reports the data, variables and methods 
used to test these propositions, namely a multi-level probit regression analysis of WBES 
data on 142 countries followed by the results in section 4. Section 5 then discusses the 
theoretical and policy implications along with the limitations and future research 
implications.  
In doing so, this paper advances understanding of informal sector entrepreneurship in 
three ways. Theoretically, this paper for the first time evaluates the validity of the four 
competing theoretical explanations for the cross-national variations in the prevalence of 
informal entrepreneurship. Meanwhile, this paper empirically provides the first multi-level 
regression analysis of the cross-national variations in the level of competition from 
unregistered and informal businesses and the validity of the four competing theoretical 
explanations for these cross-national variations. Finally, and from a policy perspective, the 
outcome will be to reveal the need for a very different policy approach toward tackling 
informal entrepreneurship than is currently used.   
2.   Explaining Informal Sector Entrepreneurship: Competing Perspectives 
Recent years have seen the emergence of a burgeoning literature on informal 
entrepreneurship (Aidis et al., 2006; Bureau and Fendt, 2011; Coletto and Bisschop, 2017; 
Kus, 2014; Mróz, 2012; Ram et al., 2017; Webb et al., 2009, 2013; Williams, 2018). This 
literature has sought to understand not only the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship 
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(Autio and Fu, 2015; Williams and Kedir, 2016, 2017) and the determinants of its variable 
prevalence (Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Siqueira et al., 2016), but also who 
participates (Thai and Turkina, 2014; Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014) and their 
motives, including whether they are necessity- and/or opportunity-driven (Adom and 
Williams, 2012; Maloney, 2004; Perry and Maloney, 2007). In this section the literature 
on the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship is reviewed first followed by the previous 
literature that has sought to explain the varying prevalence of informal sector 
entrepreneurship across different countries. 
2.1.   Prevalence of informal entrepreneurship 
Numerous small-scale and national-level studies have been previously conducted that 
estimate the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship in individual countries (e.g., 
Chepurenko, 2016; Godfrey and Dyer, 2015; London et al., 2014; Williams and Martinez-
Perez, 2014; Williams et al., 2016; Yu and Bruton, 2015). There are also some small-scale, 
cross-national comparisons. For example, a study comparing Russia, Ukraine and England 
finds that 96, 51 and 23 percent of entrepreneurs operate in the informal sector, 
respectively. However, the problem is that these findings are based on interviews with just 
130 entrepreneurs in England, 331 in Ukraine and 81 in Moscow (Williams, 2008). 
More comprehensive studies of the extent of informal entrepreneurship and how it 
varies cross-nationally have evaluated three data sets. First, there is the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra (2014), examining 51 
countries, find that 3.37 informal enterprises are created annually for every 100 people, 
while Autio and Fu (2015), using a similar measure, find that some two-thirds of 
enterprises start-up unregistered not only in emerging and transition economies (where 
0.62 informal enterprises compared with 0.37 formal enterprises are created annually for 
every 100 people) but also in OECD countries (where 0.62 informal enterprises compared 
with 0.43 formal enterprises are created annually for every 100 people). To derive these 
estimates, both studies subtract World Bank estimates of the number of registered 
businesses from the GEM estimates of the total number of new enterprises in each country. 
However, this can be only a very tentative estimate.  
Second, there is the International Labor Organization (ILO) dataset on 47 countries 
(ILO, 2011, 2012). Williams (2018), examining the 38 countries for data on informal 
entrepreneurship is available, reveals that one in six (16.6 percent) of the non-agricultural 
workforce participate in informal entrepreneurship as their main job. When those employed 
by these informal entrepreneurs are included, the finding is that 31.5 percent of the 
workforce in these 38 nations are either informal entrepreneurs or have their main job in 
informal enterprises. However, informal entrepreneurship is unevenly distributed. The 
weighted share of the workforce engaged in informal entrepreneurship for their main job 
varies from 26.1 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, through 22.7 per cent in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, to 8.5 percent in Europe and Central Asia. The cross-national variations 
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in the share of the non-agricultural workforce engaged in informal entrepreneurship, 
meanwhile, range from 58.5 percent in Mali to 2.3 percent in Serbia. 
Finally, there is the WBES, which collects data on whether formal businesses started-
up unregistered or compete with informal or unregistered businesses. Until now, this 
dataset has been seldom used to evaluate the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship. An 
exception is the study by Williams et al. (2017a), which finds that ten percent of the formal 
businesses surveyed started up unregistered but does not investigate the reasons for the 
cross-national variations in the proportion of formal enterprises that started up 
unregistered. Moreover, until now, no in-depth evaluation has taken place of the WBES 
data collected on whether formal enterprises compete with informal or unregistered 
enterprises. This paper, as will be shown below, fills that gap by utilizing this extensive 
data collected across 142 countries.  
2.2.   Theorizing cross-national variations in the scale of informal entrepreneurship 
Turning to explanations for the cross-national variations in the scale of informal sector 
entrepreneurship, the literature has until now adopted four competing theoretical 
explanations that view greater levels of informal entrepreneurship to be a result of either: 
economic under-development and a lack of modernization of governance (modernization 
theory); high taxes and state over-interference (neo-liberal theory); inadequate state 
intervention to protect workers from poverty (political economy theory), or the asymmetry 
between the laws and regulations of formal institutions and the unwritten socially shared 
rules of informal institutions (institutionalist theory).   
Until now, most previous studies of the informal sector and informal entrepreneurship 
have tended to adopt the singular logic of one or other of these competing theoretical 
perspectives. For example, La Porta and Shleifer (2008, 2014) adopt the singular logic of 
modernization theory, De Soto (1989) the singular logic of neo-liberal theory, Castells and 
Portes (1989), Davis (2006) and Slavnic (2010) the singular logic of political economy 
theory, and Webb et al. (2009) the singular logic of institutional theory. However, in recent 
years, it has been recognized that these theoretical perspectives are not mutually exclusive. 
For example, numerous studies analyzing simple bivariate correlations between the size of 
the informal sector and the various determinants across the European Union (Williams, 
2014a,b; Williams and Windebank, 2015), Central and Eastern Europe (Williams, 
2015a,c), Latin America (Williams and Youssef, 2013, 2014) and the wider developing 
world (Williams, 2015b,d) confirm the validity of the modernization, political economy 
and institutional perspectives and refute the tenets of neo-liberal theory. There have also 
been multivariate analyses of the relationship between cross-national variations in the size 
of the informal sector and the key determinants in each of these theoretical perspectives at 
the level of Central and Eastern Europe (Williams and Horodnic, 2015a), the Baltics 
(Williams and Horodnic, 2015b,c) and South-East Europe (Williams and Horodnic, 
2015d). These again confirm the validity of the modernization, political economy and 
institutional perspectives but do not confirm the tenets of the neo-liberal theory. However, 
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all these studies evaluate the relevance of these theories in relation to the size of the 
informal sector rather than the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship. 
Nevertheless, studies have evaluated the relevance of these theories for explaining 
cross-national variations in the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship. These mostly use 
simple bivariate correlations (Williams, 2014c, d). These again confirm the tenets of the 
modernization, political economy and institutional theories but not the tenets of neo-liberal 
theory. So far, multivariate regression analyses have been confined to the European Union, 
and have been limited to studies of the tendency of small businesses to pay their formal 
employees an additional undeclared (envelope) wage (Williams and Horodnic, 2016) and 
a study of the self-employed conducting some of their transactions in the informal sector 
(Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014). All these studies again confirm the validity of the 
modernization, political economy and institutional perspectives but not neo-liberal theory.  
Therefore, until now, studies evaluating the validity of these competing explanations 
for cross-national variations in the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship have studied 
only the European Union and used narrow definitions. With this study, this significant gap 
in the literature will be filled. To do so, each theoretical perspective is briefly reviewed in 
turn to formulate hypotheses that can be tested. 
2.2.1.   Modernization theory 
For most of the twentieth century, modernization theory was dominant. The recurring 
assumption was that the modern formal sector was extensive and growing while the 
informal sector was small and gradually disappearing. Entrepreneurs operating in the 
informal sector, such as street hawkers, were thus viewed as a leftover from an earlier pre-
modern mode of production and diminishing in number. The persistence of informal 
entrepreneurs in a FRXQWU\ VLJQDOHG ³under-development´ (Geertz, 1963; Gilbert, 1998; 
Lewis, 1959). In modernization theory, informal entrepreneurship is a sign of under-
development, which will disappear with economic advancement. Applying this to 
explaining the cross-national variations in the extent of informal entrepreneurship, it can 
be suggested that informal entrepreneurship is higher in less economically developed 
countries, measured in terms of GDP per capita, and in countries with less modern state 
bureaucracies, measured by the pervasiveness of public sector corruption (Torgler and 
Schneider, 2007; Tonoyan et al., 2010). Therefore, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
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Modernization hypothesis (H1): competition from unregistered and informal businesses 
will be greater in less developed economies with unmodern state bureaucracies. 
H1a: competition from unregistered and informal businesses will be greater in less 
developed economies measured in terms of GDP per capita. 
H1b: competition from unregistered and informal businesses will be greater in countries 
with less modern state bureaucracies, measured in terms of the level of public sector 
corruption. 
2.2.2.   Neo-liberal theory 
For a neo-liberal school of thought, informal entrepreneurship is a direct product of high 
taxes and too much state interference in the free market, which leads entrepreneurs to make 
a rational economic decision to voluntarily exit the formal sector to avoid the costs, time 
and effort of operating formally (e.g., Becker, 2004; De Soto, 1989, 2001; London and 
Hart, 2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; Sauvy, 1984; Small Business Council, 2004). As Becker 
(2004) puts it, ³informal work arrangements are a rational response by micro-entrepreneurs 
to over-regulation by government bureaucracies.´ Therefore, for neo-liberals, informal 
entrepreneurship is a rational economic decision pursued by entrepreneurs whose spirit is 
stifled by high taxes and state-imposed institutional constraints (De Soto, 1989, 2001; Perry 
and Maloney, 2007). Thus, the consequent solution is to pursue tax reductions, 
deregulation and minimal state intervention. Therefore, the extent of informal 
entrepreneurship should be greater in countries with higher taxes and greater state 
interference. To explore the validity of this neo-liberal explanation, the following 
hypothesis can be tested: 
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Neo-liberal hypothesis (H2): competition from unregistered and informal businesses will 
be greater in countries with higher tax rates and higher levels of state interference in the 
free market. 
H2a: competition from unregistered and informal businesses will be greater in countries 
with higher levels of state interference in the free market, measured by the regulatory 
burden. 
H2b: competition from unregistered and informal businesses will be greater in countries 
with higher tax rates, measured by the tax revenue to GDP ratio. 
H2c: competition from unregistered and informal businesses will be greater in countries 
where the expense of government as a percentage of GDP is higher. 
2.2.3.   Political economy theory 
For political economy scholars, in stark contrast to the neo-liberals, informal sector 
entrepreneurship is a direct result of a de-regulated open world economy in which 
subcontracting and outsourcing are a primary way of integrating informal entrepreneurship 
into contemporary capitalism, causing a further downward pressure on wages and the 
erosion of incomes, welfare services and benefits, and the growth of yet more informal 
entrepreneurship (Aliyev, 2015; Bhattacharya, 2014; Dibben and Williams, 2012; Dibben 
et al., 2015; Harriss-White, 2014; Portes, 1994; Slavnic, 2010). As Meagher (2010) puts 
it, ³LQIRUPDO HFRQRPLF DUUDQJHPHQWV«KDYH HQWHUHG LQWR WKH KHDUW RI FRQWHPSRrary 
economies through processes of subcontracting...and diminishing state involvement in 
popular welfare and employment.´ Informal entrepreneurship is thus viewed as an 
unregulated, precarious and low paid survival-driven endeavor undertaken by those 
excluded from the formal labor market (Castells and Portes, 1989; Davis, 2006; Gallin, 
2001; Sassen, 1996; Taiwo, 2013). It is the result of a lack of state intervention in work 
and welfare provision, including social protection and social transfers, and a direct product 
of poverty. In consequence, this practice is viewed as more prevalent in countries with 
inadequate state intervention to protect workers from poverty (Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001; 
Slavnic, 2010). Therefore, to evaluate the validity of this political economy explanation, 
the following hypothesis can be tested: 
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Political economy hypothesis (H3): competition from unregistered and informal businesses 
will be greater in economies with lower levels of state intervention. 
H3a: competition from unregistered and informal businesses will be greater in those 
countries where the regulatory burden is higher. 
H3b: competition from unregistered and informal businesses will be greater in those 
countries with lower tax to GDP ratios. 
H3c: competition from unregistered and informal businesses will be greater in those 
countries where the expense of government as a percentage of GDP is lower. 
2.2.4.   Institutional theory 
For institutional theorists, a problem with all the above theories is that they do not explain 
why some entrepreneurs in a country participate in the informal sector and others do not; 
they do not take agency into account. However, drawing upon institutional theory, this has 
started to be overcome (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Denzau and North 1994; North, 1990). 
In this theoretical perspective, institutions are the rules of the game that govern behavior, 
and all societies possess both formal institutions (i.e., laws and regulations) that set out the 
legal rules of the game, as well as informal institutions, which are the unwritten socially 
shared rules that exist outside of officially sanctioned channels (Helmke and Levitsky, 
2004; Krasniqi and Desai, 2016), and are the norms, values and beliefs held regarding what 
is right and acceptable (Denzau and North, 1994). Thus, formal entrepreneurship is an 
endeavor occurring within the formal institutional prescriptions set out in the laws and 
regulations, while informal entrepreneurship occurs outside of formal institutional 
prescriptions but within the norms, values and beliefs of informal institutions (Godfrey, 
2011; Kistruck et al., 2015; Siqueira et al., 2016; Webb et al., 2009; Welter et al., 2015; 
Williams and Gurtoo, 2017). As Webb et al. (2009) put it, ³the informal economy exists 
because of the incongruence between what is defined as legitimate by formal and informal 
institutions.´ Viewed through this institutionalist lens, cross-national variations in the 
prevalence of informal entrepreneurship have been explained as resulting from the 
asymmetry between the laws and regulations of formal institutions and the norms, values 
and beliefs of informal institutions (Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Godfrey, 2015; 
Kistruck et al., 2015; Siqueira et al., 2016; Sutter et al., 2017; Thai and Turkina, 2014; Vu, 
2014; Webb and Ireland, 2015; Webb et al., 2009, 2013, 2014; Williams et al., 2017). The 
assertion is that the greater the degree of incongruence (i.e., non-alignment) between 
formal and informal institutions, the higher is the level of informal entrepreneurship 
(Williams and Shahid, 2016). Therefore, to test institutional theory, the following 
hypothesis can be tested: 
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Institutional asymmetry hypothesis (H4): the greater the asymmetry between formal and 
informal institutions, the greater is the competition from unregistered and informal 
businesses. 
3.   Data, Variables and Methods 
3.1.   Data 
To test the above hypotheses, WBES data from 142 countries across the globe is analyzed. 
This includes fifteen developed countries (including Germany, Spain, Ireland and South 
Korea) and 127 developing countries, including 41 in Africa, thirteen in East Asia and the 
Pacific region, 29 in Europe and Central Asia, 31 in Latin America and Caribbean, seven 
in the Middle East and North Africa and six in South Asia. Of all countries surveyed, 25 
are low-income countries, 42 lower middle-income countries, 36 middle-income countries, 
four upper middle-income countries, and 20 high-income countries. All world regions and 
levels of economic development are thus covered by this survey.  
In each country, the WBES collects data using a stratified random sample of non-
agricultural formal private sector businesses with five or more employees, which is 
stratified by firm size, business sector and geographic region. The firm size strata in the 
WBES are 5-19 (small), 20-99 (medium), and 100+ employees (large-sized firms), while 
sector is broken down into manufacturing, services, transportation and construction. Public 
utilities, government services, health care and financial services sectors are not included, 
and in larger economies, manufacturing sub-sectors are selected as additional strata based 
on employment, value-added and total number of establishments. Geographical regions 
within a country are selected based on which cities/regions collectively contain the 
majority of economic activity. The sampling frame is derived from the universe of eligible 
firms, normally REWDLQHGIURPWKHFRXQWU\¶VVWDWLVWLFDORIILFHRUDQRWKHUJRYHUQPHQWDJHQF\
such as the tax or business licensing authorities. Since 2006, all national surveys explain 
the source of the sample frame. 
To collect data, a harmonized questionnaire is used across all countries, answered by 
some 1200-1800 business owners and top managers in larger economies, 360 in medium-
sized economies and 150 in smaller economies. Although the WBES has collected data 
since 2002, the sample here is restricted to the 142 countries that, since 2006, have used 
the harmonized questionnaire and common sampling methodology, which assures that data 
is comparable across countries and over time.  
3.2.   Dependent variable   
Until now, studies have analyzed cross-national variations in either the proportion of 
unregistered enterprises or the proportion of formal enterprises that started-up unregistered 
(Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Kistruck et al., 2015; Siqueira et al., 2016; Thai and 
Turkina, 2014; Williams et al., 2017a). However, this does not cover formal enterprises 
that under-report a portion of their sales. Therefore, to measure more fully entrepreneurship 
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in the informal sector, an analysis is undertaken here of whether entrepreneurs report 
competing against unregistered or informal enterprises. To do so, a WBES question is used 
that examines responses to the question, ³Does this establishment compete against 
unregistered or informal firms?´ This is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
firms declare they are competing against unregistered or informal firms and a value of 0 
otherwise.  
3.3.   Key independent variables  
To test the theories explaining cross-national variations in the prevalence of informal 
entrepreneurship, both firm-level and country-level variables are used that capture the 
tenets of the modernization, neo-liberal, political economy and institutional perspectives.  
To analyze the various tenets in hypotheses H1-4, variables are analyzed used in 
previous studies evaluating these hypotheses in relation to the informal sector (discussed 
in section 2.2). To evaluate the economic development tenet of the modernization 
hypothesis (H1a), the indicator used is: 
x the current GDP per capita of each country expressed as the purchasing power parity 
in international dollars transformed in natural logs. This was retrieved from IMF World 
Economic Outlook Database for the relevant years for each country surveyed.   
To evaluate the modernization of governance hypothesis (H1b), a composite index is used 
that evaluates corruption behaviors available in the WBES, namely:  
x Corruption composite index: a dummy variable that indicates whether the entrepreneur 
KDV SDLG SXEOLF RIILFLDOV EULEHV DQG RWKHU SD\PHQWV WR µJHW WKLQJV JRQH¶ in relation to 
customs, taxes, licenses, permits, regulations and services. It takes a value of 1 if 
responding firms reported making any of those payments and 0 otherwise.  
Meanwhile, to test both the tenets of the neo-liberal thesis (H2) that state interference 
increases competition from unregistered and informal businesses and the inverse political 
economy thesis that state intervention reduces such competition from the informal sector 
(H3), three indicators of the level of state intervention are employed, namely:   
x Regulatory burden composite index, which is captured by their answers to questions 
about whether they face obstacles in the form of customs, trade and labor regulations. This 
is a dummy variable defined by giving a value of 1 to those firms that say that customs, 
trade and labor regulations are obstacles to their operations and 0 otherwise.  
x Tax revenue to GDP ratio, from the IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
x Expense of government as a percent of GDP, which is a measure of the size of 
government and therefore, a loose proxy of the degree of intervention. The expense of 
government is the level of cash payments for the operating activities of the government in 
providing goods and services. It includes compensation of employees (such as wages and 
salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits and other expenses such as rent and 
dividends (World Bank, 2017). 
To test the institutional asymmetry hypothesis (H4), while holding constant the firm-
level control variables, the indicator used is:  
x Trust in the court system, measured by the percentage of firms believing the court 
system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted. This is based on the response to the following 
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questioQ³,DPJRLQJWRUHDGVRPHVWDWHPHQWVWKDWGHVFULEHWKHFRXUWVV\VWHPDQGKRZLW
could affect business. For each statement, please tell me if you strongly disagree, tend to 
disagree, tend to agree, or strongly agree.´7KLVLVDGXPP\YDULDEOHZLWKDYDOXH of 1 given 
WRWKRVHILUPVZKRDJUHHDQGVWURQJO\DJUHHWKDWµWKHFRXUWV\VWHPLV IDLU LPSDUWLDODQG
XQFRUUXSWHG¶DQGDYDOXHRIIRUWKRVHZKRGLVDJUHHRUVWURQJO\GLVDJUHH 
3.4.   Other control variables 
To control for other key explanatory variables that may DOVRDIIHFWILUPV¶FRPSHWLWLRQZLWK
unregistered and informal competitors, a series of firm-level variables are included derived 
from previous studies, which reveal the individual-level variables that influence the 
likelihood of competing with informal competitors both in previous analyses of the WBES 
data (Hudson et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2017a) and other studies of entrepreneurship in 
the informal sector (Dau and Cuervo-Cazzurra, 2014; Hodosi, 2015; Khan and Quaddus, 
2015; Thai and Turkina, 2014; Vu, 2014). These firm-level control variables are: 
x Firm age: a continuous variable for the number of years since the firm was established. 
x Foreign-RZQHGDGXPP\YDULDEOHZLWKYDOXHLQGLFDWLQJLIWKHVKDUHRIWKHILUP¶V
ownership held by foreign individuals or enterprises is larger than 49 per cent. 
x Export-RULHQWDWLRQDGXPP\YDULDEOHZLWKYDOXHLQGLFDWLQJWKHSURSRUWLRQRIILUP¶V
sales for the export market and 0 for the share of sales for the domestic market. 
x Firm size: a categorical variable with value 1 for small firms with less than 20 
employees, value 2 for medium size firms between 20 and 99 employees, and value 3 for 
large firms with more than 100 employees. 
x Legal status: a categorical variable indicating whether the legal form of the firm is an 
open shareholding, a closed shareholding, a sole proprietorship, a partnership, a limited 
partnership, or any other form. 
x Quality certification, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating the firm has an 
internationally-recognized certification and 0 otherwise;  
x External auditor, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating the firm has its annual 
financial statement reviewed by an external auditor and 0 otherwise; 
x Presence of a website, a dummy variable with value 1 when the firm uses a website 
for business related activities and 0 otherwise; 
x Use of e-mail, a dummy variable with value 1 when a firm uses e-mail to interact with 
clients and suppliers and 0 otherwise; 
x 7RSPDQDJHU¶VH[SHULHQFHDFRQWLQXRXVYDULDEOHRIWKH\HDUVRIH[SHULHQFHWKHWRS
manager has in the sector;  
x Temporary workers, a variable measuring the average number of temporary workers 
in the firm;  
x Permanent full-time workers, a continuous variable of the average number of 
permanent full-time workers in the firm;  
x Female full-time workers, examining the share of permanent full-time workers that are 
female; and 
x Female involvement in ownership, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating whether 
women are involved in the ownership of the firm and 0 otherwise.  
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3.5.   Methods 
To evaluate the country-level determinants of whether formal firms are more likely to state 
that they compete with unregistered and informal entrepreneurs across the 142 countries, 
multilevel techniques are used. Given that the surveyed enterprises in the WBES are 
clustered across country-year subsamples, multilevel modeling is the optimal technique to 
elicit unbiased standard errors as well as reliable statistical comparisons. The estimating 
standard probit equation takes the following form: 
iii xI 11
'
1 HE  
 
where ix1 denotes a vector of exogenous variables capturing firm-level characteristics and 
iI represents whether formal firms compete with unregistered and informal firms. The 
error term i1H  is normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance.  
4.   Findings: Explaining Cross-national Variations in Informal Entrepreneurship 
The finding is that 41.9 percent of formal businesses surveyed in these 142 countries report 
that they compete against unregistered or informal enterprises. Therefore, a large 
proportion of the formal business community competes against informal and unregistered 
enterprises. However, the share of formal enterprises that identify themselves as competing 
against unregistered or formal firms is uneven. As Table 1 displays, the proportion 
competing against unregistered and informal enterprises ranges from a high of 52.1 percent 
in sub-Saharan Africa to a low of 20.5 percent in OECD nations. There are also significant 
cross-national variations in the extent to which formal enterprises find themselves in 
competition with unregistered and informal enterprises, ranging from 85 percent in 
Suriname, 84 percent in Cameron and 82 percent in Tonga to eleven percent in Namibia, 
fourteen percent in Venezuela and seventeen percent in The Gambia. 
Table 1. Prevalence of informal entrepreneurship, by global region 
Region % of formal enterprises competing against 
unregistered or informal firms 
Sub-Saharan Africa  52.1 
East Asia and Pacific 45.9 
Europe and Central Asia 36.7 
Latin American & Caribbean  42.1 
Middle East & North Africa  42.1 
South Asia  26.5 
OECD 20.5 
All  41.9 
SourceDXWKRU¶VRZQFDOFXODWLRQVIURP:RUOG%DQN(QWHUSULVH6XUYH\:%(6GDWDVHW 
Therefore, how can cross-national variations be explained? Is it the case, as the 
modernization thesis suggests, that cross-national variations in the prevalence of informal 
entrepreneurship are associated with the level of economic development and the 
modernization of governance? Or is it the case, as the neo-liberal thesis, asserts that these 
cross-national variations are associated with high taxes and too much state interference in 
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the free market? Alternatively, are the cross-national variations more associated with 
inadequate state intervention to protect workers from poverty? Or is it the case that cross-
national variations in the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship are significantly 
associated with the asymmetry between formal and informal institutions? 
Table 2 evaluates the likelihood of a formal firm competing with an unregistered or 
informal firm across the 142 countries. Model 1 reports the standard probit coefficient 
estimates of the probability of a formal firm competing with an unregistered or informal 
enterprise using only the firm-level variables. This reveals that the effect of firm age on 
informality is positive with older firms being more likely to compete with unregistered or 
informal enterprises. Firms that export and are foreign-owned are significantly less likely 
to compete with informal and unregistered enterprises than non-exporting and domestic-
owned enterprises, doubtless because they operate in different market segments.  
7XUQLQJWRZRUNIRUFHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWRSPDQDJHU¶VZRUNH[SHULHQFHLQWKHVHFWRULV
positively and significantly associated with competing with informal and unregistered 
businesses, perhaps indicating they are in a relatively advantageous position of detecting 
the competition from unregistered or informal firms. Firms with full-time permanent and 
female workers are less likely to compete with informal and unregistered enterprises, as 
are firms where women are involved in its ownership.  
Analyzing innovation and technology, formal firms with quality certification are less 
likely to compete with unregistered and informal enterprises, but those with a website are 
more likely to do so. Akin to previous studies (Galiani and Weinschelbaum, 2012; Kanbur, 
2015), firm size is negatively associated with the likelihood of competing with informal 
and unregistered enterprises; small businesses are more likely to do so than medium-sized 
and larger enterprises. And finally, and in relation to legal status, there are positive and 
significant coefficients of sole proprietor and partnerships; they are more likely to compete 
with informal and unregistered enterprises. 
Table 2. Probit model of determinants of whether formal firms compete with unregistered or 
informal enterprises, WBES 2006-2014 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln(GDPPC)  -0.109*** (0.007)  
Corruption   0.192*** (0.012) 
Trust -0.117***(0.011) -0.115***(0.011) -0.051*** (0.011) 
Firm characteristics    
Firm Age 0.002***(0.000) 0.002***(0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 
Exporter -0.002***(0.000) -0.002***(0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) 
Foreign Ownership -0.216***(0.020) -0.216***(0.020) -0.137*** (0.019) 
Workforce    
Top Manager Experience 0.003***(0.001) 0.003***(0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 
Temporary Worker -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
Permanent Full-time  -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
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Table 2 (continued). Probit model of determinants of whether formal firms compete with 
unregistered or informal enterprises, WBES 2006-2014 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Female full- Time -0.002*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.001** 
(0.000) 
Female Share in Ownership 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Innovation and Technology    
Quality Certification -0.000** (0.000) -0.000** (0.000) -0.000** 
(0.000) 
External Auditor 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
Website 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
E-mail 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Firm size (R.C. Small)    
Medium -0.071*** (0.013) -0.069*** (0.013) -0.090*** 
(0.013) 
Large -0.159*** (0.020) -0.158*** (0.020) -0.196*** 
(0.020) 
Legal status (R.C: Open shareholding)    
Closed Shareholding 0.012 (0.025) 0.016 (0.025) 0.035 (0.025) 
Sole Proprietor 0.164*** (0.027) 0.169*** (0.027) 0.201*** 
(0.026) 
Partnership 0.062* (0.032) 0.068**(0.033) 0.041 (0.032) 
Limited Partnership 0.064** (0.031) 0.068** (0.031) 0.205*** 
(0.030) 
Other Form 0.023 (0.046) 0.026 (0.046) 0.087* (0.046) 
Sector dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -6.182 (86.956) -6.154 (86.889) -5.666 
(124.176) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.16 0.17 0.15 
N 67,515 66,588 66,588 
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Table 2 (continued). Probit model of determinants of whether formal firms compete with 
unregistered or informal enterprises, WBES 2006-2014 
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Regulatory Burden -0.092*** 
(0.024) 
  
Tax Revenue to GDP ratio  -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 
Expense of government as % of GDP   -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Trust -0.115*** 
(0.011) 
-0.091*** 
(0.017) 
-0.069*** 
(0.015) 
Firm characteristics    
Firm Age 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.001** (0.001) 
Exporter -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
Foreign Ownership -0.213*** 
(0.020) 
-0.190*** 
(0.027) 
-0.152*** 
(0.026) 
Workforce    
Top Manager Experience 0.003*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002**(0.001) 
Temporary Worker -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Permanent Full-time  -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000***(0.000) 
Female full- Time -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001***(0.000) 
Female Share In Ownership 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Innovation and Technology    
Quality Certification -0.000** (0.000) -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001**(0.000) 
External Auditor 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Website 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
E-mail 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
Firm size (R.C. Small)    
Medium -0.069*** 
(0.013) 
-0.113*** 
(0.019) 
-0.101*** 
(0.018) 
Large -0.156*** 
(0.020) 
-0.243*** 
(0.030) 
-0.259*** 
(0.028) 
Legal status (R.C: Open 
shareholding) 
   
Closed Shareholding 0.018 (0.025) 0.098*** (0.034) 0.068** (0.032) 
Sole Proprietor 0.170*** (0.027) 0.122*** (0.038) 0.059* (0.035) 
Partnership 0.069** (0.033) -0.002 (0.048) -0.116** (0.045) 
Limited Partnership 0.069** (0.031) 0.011 (0.051) -0.050 (0.048) 
Other Form 0.027 (0.046) 0.141** (0.066) 0.137** (0.064) 
Sector dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -6.165 (86.969) -6.045 (221.551) (120.580) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.17 0.16 0.16 
N 66,588 32,393 36,162 
N.B.: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** 
significant at one percent.  
SourceDXWKRU¶VRZQFDOFXODWLRQVIURP:%(6 
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Model 2 adds the country-level indicator of the log of GDP per capita and shows a 
significant negative association. This confirms the first tenet of the modernization thesis 
(H1a), namely that the higher the GDP per capita, the lower is the probability that formal 
firms compete with informal and unregistered enterprises. Importantly, the significances 
and signs of all the first-level variables in model 1 remain the same when this country-level 
variable is added in model 2. The remaining models then include each of the country-level 
variables associated with each tenet of the remaining theoretical explanations in a 
sequential manner.   
To evaluate the second tenet of the modernization thesis regarding whether the quality 
of governance, measured here in terms of the level of corruption, is significantly associated 
with the likelihood of competing with informal or unregistered enterprises, model 3 finds 
a positive association. The higher is the level of corruption, the higher is the likelihood 
formal firms compete with unregistered or informal enterprises. Therefore, this confirms 
hypothesis H1b of the modernization thesis. 
Turning to the neo-liberal thesis (H2), the first tenet to be analyzed is the regulatory 
burden hypothesis that the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship is greater in countries 
with higher levels of state interference in the free market, measured by the regulatory 
burden. Model 4 reveals a statistically significant association, but the sign is in the opposite 
direction to that suggested by the neo-liberal thesis. The greater is the level of regulation, 
the less likely are formal firms to compete with informal or unregistered firms (refuting 
H2a). Therefore, this is supportive of the political economy explanation; the greater the 
level of state intervention, the less likely are formal firms to be competing with informal 
or unregistered enterprises (confirming H3a).  
It is similarly the case when hypothesis H2b is tested, namely that competition from 
unregistered and informal enterprises will be greater in countries with higher tax rates, 
measured by the tax revenue to GDP ratio. Contrary to the neo-liberal thesis, model 5 
reveals that the opposite is again the case. The higher is the level of tax revenue to GDP 
ratio, the less likely are formal firms to be competing with informal or unregistered 
enterprises. This refutes H2b and is supportive of the political economy view that the 
greater the level of state intervention, measured here by the tax revenue to GDP ratio, the 
less likely are formal firms to compete with informal and unregistered enterprises 
(confirming H3b). 
Meanwhile, as a test of whether informal entrepreneurship is because of too much or 
too little state intervention, the association with the expense of government as a percentage 
of GDP is evaluated. This refutes the view that the greater the expense of government (as 
a percentage of GDP), the greater is the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship (refuting 
H2c). Instead, quite the opposite is found to be the case. The greater the expense of 
government (as a percentage of GDP), the lower is the prevalence of informal 
entrepreneurship (confirming H3c). 
The final important theoretical finding is that there is strong significant negative 
association between trust in formal institutions (measured by whether the court system is 
viewed as fair, impartial and uncorrupted) and the likelihood of formal firms competing 
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against unregistered and informal enterprises; the lower the trust in formal institutions, the 
greater is the probability that formal firms compete with unregistered or informal 
enterprises. Across all the models, the greater the institutional asymmetry, the greater is 
the likelihood of competing against informal or unregistered enterprises (confirming H4). 
5.   Discussion and Conclusions 
Evaluating WBES data from 142 countries on the cross-national variations in the extent to 
which formal enterprises compete with unregistered or informal competitors, a multivariate 
regression analysis has refuted neo-liberal theory but confirmed the modernization, 
political economy and institutional theories. Therefore, the theoretical and policy 
implications are discussed here.  
Theoretically, this reveals it is important to transcend singular logics when explaining 
cross-national variations in the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship. These theoretical 
perspectives are not mutually exclusive. Instead, if cross-national variations in the extent 
of informal entrepreneurship are to be more fully understood, there is a need to combine 
the tenets of the modernization, political economy and institutional theories. The finding 
is that the propensity of formal enterprises to compete with informal unregistered 
businesses (i.e., the level of informal entrepreneurship) is greater in countries where the 
level of institutional incongruence is higher, there is a lower level of economic 
development and lower quality of governance, and lower levels of state intervention.  
These findings have implications for how informal entrepreneurship is tackled. 
Conventionally, the dominant policy approach has been for enforcement authorities such 
as tax and labor administrations to use disincentives (³sticks´) to tackle informal sector 
entrepreneurship. The intention is to ensure the cost of being caught and punished is greater 
than the pay-off from participating in the informal sector (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). 
This is achieved by increasing the sanctions and/or the perceived or actual risks of 
detection. Recently, incentives (³carrots´) to encourage formal entrepreneurship have also 
started to be used (Matthias et al., 2014) to increase the benefits of formalization rather 
than focus on purely the costs of informality.   
However, and as this paper has shown, the problem with this approach is that it does 
not change the structural economic and social conditions that determine the level of 
informal entrepreneurship. Tax and labor administrations are simply dealing with the 
effects by increasing the sanctions and risks of detection, or providing incentives to 
formalize. They are not dealing with the determinants. To achieve this, there is a need for 
a more macro-level approach. As this paper has revealed, the likelihood of formal firms 
competing with unregistered or informal enterprises is higher in countries where GDP per 
capita is lower, there are higher levels of corruption, the level of regulations is lower, the 
tax revenue to GDP ratio is lower and the expense of government as a percentage of GDP 
is lower. Therefore, there is a need for state intervention at a more macro-level to tackle 
entrepreneurship in the informal sector.  
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Competition from informal and unregistered enterprises will only reduce if these 
structural conditions are addressed. On the one hand, the lack of trust in the state 
(represented by the level of institutional asymmetry) and extensive corruption in the public 
sector needs to be tackled through a modernization of governance. This requires, at a 
minimum, improvements in first, procedural fairness so entrepreneurs believe they are 
paying their fair share compared with others (Molero and Pujol, 2012); second, procedural 
justice, so entrepreneurs believe the authorities treat them in a respectful, impartial and 
responsible manner (Murphy, 2005) and finally, redistributive justice, so entrepreneurs 
believe they receive the goods and services they deserve given the taxes they pay 
(Kirchgässner, 2010). On the other hand, and as the models in Table 2 reveal, governments 
also need to pursue wider economic and social developments, increasing the level of GDP 
per capita and the level of state intervention by improving the tax revenue to GDP ratio 
and increasing the expense of government as a percentage of GDP. 
Although this paper reveals that the level of competition from informal and 
unregistered enterprises is associated with such structural conditions, there are limitations 
to what can be concluded and caveats required. First, a major limitation of this study is that 
informal entrepreneurship has been examined only through the lens of formal enterprises 
competing with unregistered and informal businesses. The problem is that cross-national 
enterprise surveys have not so far directly asked businesses about whether they participate 
in the informal sector, despite some enterprise surveys in specific localities and nations 
displaying this is feasible (De Castro et al., 2014; Williams and Shahid, 2016). Therefore, 
future cross-national surveys perhaps should be less reticent about doing so.  
Second, when the WBES measures competition from informal and unregistered 
competitors, it does not define what is meant by these terms. However, respondents may 
interpret registration in multifarious ways (e.g., possessing a local trading license, being 
UHJLVWHUHG XQGHU IDFWRULHV¶ RU FRPPHUFLDO DFWV UHJLVWHUHG XQGHU SURIHVVLRQDO JURXSV¶
regulatory acts).  
7KLUGWKLVVXUYH\GRHVQRWLQYHVWLJDWHWKHSHUFHSWLRQVRIHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶UHJDUGLQJWKH
reasons for informal entrepreneurship (e.g., whether it is more because of push or pull 
factors), the reasons for being unregistered (e.g., whether they are simply awaiting 
registration, test-trading on an unregistered basis to evaluate WKHYHQWXUH¶VYLDELOLW\EHIRUH
registering, or have no initial intention of registering) or reasons for registration (e.g., better 
access to finance or markets, fewer bribes, contracts with formal firms, more access to 
government contracts).  
Finally, only a broad set of structural determinants have been investigated here, 
especially in relation to state intervention. Therefore, future research needs both to identify 
reasons for businesses being informal and unregistered and to evaluate in greater detail the 
type of state interventions leading to reduced levels of informality (e.g., active labor market 
policies, educational provision, social protection spending) for government to be able to 
better tailor policy initiatives.   
If this paper stimulates entrepreneurship scholars to further advance their explanations 
of cross-national variations in the extent of informal entrepreneurship by synthesizing the 
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modernization, political economy and institutionalist theories, then it will have fulfilled 
one of its intentions. If this then results in governments tackling informal entrepreneurship 
by dealing witKLWVVWUXFWXUDOGHWHUPLQDQWVUDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\XVLQJ³VWLFNV´DQG³FDUURWV´
to deal with the effects, then this paper will have fulfilled its wider intention. What is certain 
however, is that no evidence has been found here that decreasing taxes and reducing state 
intervention is the way forward.  
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